

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

50-L

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Action

Control:

18745

EUR

Rec'd:

October 26, 1962
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Info

FROM:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CCD/IR

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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RECORDED BY *[Signature]* DATE *3/3/68*

SP

NO: *[Redacted]* October 26, 5 p.m.

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ROUTED BY *[Signature]* TO *[Signature]*
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FOR DISCUSSION *(b) (1)*

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ACTION DEPARTMENT

INFORMATION

NEA

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Tour d'horizon with *[Redacted]* and subsequent
visit discuss circular telegram 730 and 744:

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RMR

[Redacted] and Soviet Ambassador. Soviet
presented prepared statement followed by oral presentation
"all playing old phonograph record of how Soviets love peace,
with no hard or new facts".

[Redacted] said reaction of *[Redacted]* people to United States action
Cuba exactly same as reaction American people: Relief that
necessary action has been taken, coupled with apprehension
as to what happens next. Having just returned from *[Redacted]*
[Redacted] he noted Scandinavians more concerned re
Cuba than he found *[Redacted]* here.

[Redacted] main current of thinking is directed to evaluation
possible developments in UN. Believes Soviet Security Council
veto inevitable; wonders whether might not be to United States
advantage not to take matter to General Assembly. Anticipates
neither United States nor Soviet resolutions likely obtain
two-thirds majority. Should United States resolution not be
adopted, he questions whether US would not find itself in
worse situation than if we "had not gone to GA at all". He
repeated, "if United States could be sure two-thirds majority
in GA, that would be excellent solution. But if it should
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-2-201, October 26, 5 p.m. from Bern.

prove United States could not obtain it, we would have loaded UN with task it could not handle, thus weakening UN and causing only prolonged debate. [] expects 12 pro-French African states would support United States, but thinks we could not carry two-thirds GA without Mid-East.

[] heartened by OAS support of United States. He felt Italy would be weak link in our efforts obtain support from NATO. Nenni, Sarragat lean left and Fanfani wants to survive. [] noted with disapprobation of Italy that its only commendation of United States was for our taking matter to UN.

Questioned what reports re Cuba GOS receiving from [] bloc countries, [] replied only useful one so far was his report from Warsaw that Polish press published full text Kennedy speech and Soviet reply, but had not carried single word re Sino-Indian conflict.

Re bearing Sino-Indian conflict Cuban crisis, [] felt more Cuban conflict sharpens, closer USSR and China would be drawn in rapprochement. To question whether open CHICOM invasion India helps substantiate before world opinion United States charges SOVCOM offensive buildup Cuba, [] replied "analogy likely only be made in those countries-where thinking is in usage." He has "no confidence ability or desire neutralists to analyze things as they are," says "only convincing will be of those already convinced." [] believes Soviets dislike Chinese aggression against India, which does not fit into Soviet plans, even excluding bad timing re Cuba; nevertheless, although they would like keep India in line, Soviets cannot oppose China. "MIG shipment India fluke not to be repeated. Delhi will find no good news in Soviet position just published PRAVDA. Had it not been for Ladakh, et cetera, India would be speaking in UN now opposing United States in Cuba." [] feels Nehru, Menon have put themselves in box: India cannot take Chinese aggression to UN, in view their own unilateral actions Kashmir,

Goa.

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Goa. Thinks Indian military reverses will continue.

Foregoing to contrary notwithstanding, believe I made some headway convincing [] desirability [] offering quiet guidance [] press linking Indian, Cuban development.

Specific to Department circular 744, final paragraph, [] believes USSR was convinced even prior to Cuban crisis, firmness United States resolution not to yield on our three cardinal points on Berlin. "Soviets caught off balance by our action Cuba; not clear either that Russians will do anything, or that they will not. If they do, Turkey Iran more likely scene Soviet action than Berlin or Cuba; USSR might attempt unilateral action there similar ours Cuba, or at least brandish demands"

[] feels United States distinction between quarantine, blockade jesuitical; say "quarantine this type has no basis international law."

JAK

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